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1Religious Symbols and the Making of Contemporary Religious Identities   
Sylvie Bacquet1
Introduction
Symbols, religious or otherwise, play a large part in the life of individuals as 
they are closely linked to their cultural heritage and often contribute to the making of 
a person’s identity. A symbol may be a piece of jewellery such as a wedding ring, a 
kara bangle2 a cross or a string3 or it may be a particular form of dress (jilbab,4 
niqab,5saari6) or head cover (Jewish skullcap, Muslim hijab, Sikh turban). 
Alternatively, it may take the shape of statues displayed in the home or carried by an 
individual. Symbols may be more or less visible, depending on their nature and on 
whether they are confined to the private sphere or carried into the public domain. 
Once in the public sphere, religious symbols are subject to a certain degree of 
scrutiny, often fuelled by curiosity, fear and sometimes ignorance. When associated 
with a particular ideology, symbols can indeed send negative messages - skin heads 
and swastikas for instance are often associated with far Right movements which 
promote racism and hatred. Religious symbols can be used to dissimulate terrorist 
plots, for example, Islamic dress can be used to disguise a suicide bomber (Haider, 
2010).
State interference with such symbols therefore must be an integral part of 
modern democracies for the purpose of protection of citizens. However, in seeking to 
protect the majority, States must not encroach on fundamental human rights such as 
1Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Westminster. This research would not have been possible without the 
generous participation of the students and staff of the Law School at the University of Westminster who took part 
in the interviews and shared their experience with me. Thanks are also due to Professor Lisa Webley for her 
constant support and mentoring throughout this project. 
2Part of the 5Ks worn by followers of the Sikh Faith.
3E.g. Red string worn by Kaballahbelievers.
4Long garment worn by Muslim female.
5Full body garment, usually black that covers the entire body, leaving only a space for the eyes.
6Garment worn by women from India and Pakistan.
2the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression enshrined in Article 9 and 
10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This balancing exercise is 
one that has caused much debate and controversy amongst judges, policy makers and 
legal academics. While some states like the UK have been fairly liberal in their 
tolerance to symbols, others like France have adopted a more radical secularist 
approach, banning those symbols from the public sphere (Bacquet, 2012).
This chapter will present findings from an empirical study on the relationship 
between, the State, individuals and religious symbols. It starts from the premise that 
laws and policies concerning manifestation of belief are typically made at 
Government level and therefore remote from those for whom it matters. To date, there 
have been few documented efforts by governments to attempt to gain an 
understanding of the role that these types of symbols really play in the life of some 
individuals (Hunter-Henin, 2012).7 Only with the full understanding of what symbols 
mean for individuals can we assess the real impact of State interference with religious 
symbols. Such interference may be prescribed by law as in France where, for instance, 
religious symbols are banned from State schools or upheld by the courts as in the UK 
where judges have often acted as ‘arbiters of faith’ and upheld schools’ exclusions of 
pupils for wearing a religious symbol.8
This study sought to elucidate the nature of the relationship between 
individuals and their religious symbols as well as their general perception of religious 
symbols in the public sphere. The research questions explored the importance that 
individuals give to religious symbols and the extent to which they are prepared to 
tolerate some degree of interference by the State. While the empirical study was 
7
 On this lack of empirical research in relation to the French Parliament and the full face cover legislation see 
further (Hunter-Henin, 2012). 
8See further (Bacquet 2009 and 2012). 
3carried out in England, the findings form the basis of a criticism of the approaches in 
both England and France. 
These research questions are of great contemporary significance. The need to 
pay attention to the impact of the law on cultural, ethnic and religious minorities has 
been widely acknowledged by European monitoring bodies (European Commission 
2011).9 This has coincided with rising religious restrictions being adopted across the 
world.10However, recent legal empirical research has tended to concentrate on 
religion and belief in public life rather than symbols as such. It focused on 
accommodation of religious, cultural and ethnic diversity (European Commission 
2011) as well as religious discrimination (Weller, 2011). The theme of religious 
symbols in the public sphere has attracted much academic attention across disciplines. 
The literature therefore is at the crossroad of law, sociology, anthropology, theology, 
psychology and philosophy.11 State regulation of religious symbols both in the UK 
and in other European jurisdictions has been examined extensively by legal 
academics,12with the main emphasis being put on laws, policies and judicial 
approaches while individuals’ relationships with religious symbols have received less 
attention and tended to concentrate on the issues facing Muslim women and the hijab 
rather than other symbols.13 This project therefore aimed to contribute to knowledge 
and understanding of individuals’ relationship with religious symbols and religion in 
general and also to examine the impact of State regulation/restrictions of religious 
symbols on individuals. Before discussing the findings of the research project, there 
9See for instance, (European Commission, 2011).
10
 According to Pew Research Center, religious attire and other symbols were regulated in 57 countries as opposed 
to 21 in mid-2007(Pew Research Centre, 2012). 
11
 See for instance (Durkheim, 1912); (Eliade, 1991); (Sherman Grant, 2001); (Dundes Renteln, 2004); (Hill and 
Whistler, 2013); (van Ooijen, 2013); (Weisbuch-Remington et al, 2005).       
12
 See for instance (Bacquet, 2008 and 2009); (Cumper and Lewis, 2012); (Doe, 2011);(Hill et al.,2011); (Hunter-
Henin, 2012); (Sandberg, 2011).      
13
 See for instance (Cole and Ahmadi, 2003);(Hunter-Henin, 2012) but see, e.g., (Jaspal, 2013); (Gereluk, 2008). 
4are some preliminary remarks that need to be made about the research methodology 
employed and the legal background. 
Methodology 
The research project consisted of qualitative research, which was conducted 
using 23 face to face interviews with 25 students and staff at the University of 
Westminster in London (two were group interviews). This chapter examines the views 
of those who responded to an invitation to take part in the project. The respondents 
were drawn mainly from the Law School but not exclusively as the use of 
snowballing sampling techniques targeted respondents from other Schools as well. 
Participants initially self-selected by replying to a call to take part in the project, then 
existing participants were able to recruit additional participants from among their 
acquaintances, some of which were outside the Law School. A robust sample was 
produced comprising a range of religious14 ethnic15 and age groups16 which reflected 
the University of Westminster’s multicultural environment. In keeping with 
qualitative methodology, there was no requirement for the sample to be representative 
of the entire student population.17 Moreover, given that the University of Westminster 
does not currently keep data on religion and ethnicity, it would not have been possible 
to test the representativeness of the current sample against the entire student 
population. As pointed by Weller (2011), this lack of monitoring of religion and belief 
14
 Christianity, Islam, Sikhism, Hinduism, Buddhism are amongst the main religions represented as well as 
Atheism, Agnosticism and Humanism. Judaism is the only religion that is not represented in the study. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the University does not have a high Jewish student population (there are 50 students 
within the University Jewish Society out of a student population of 20,000 students). The sample also comprised 
eight converts.   
15
 19 out of the 25 participants were women. Out of the total sample seven were classed as ‘white’, one as ‘black’, 
12 as ‘Asian’ and four as ‘other’ which included Arab and Persian.
16
 Respondents were 18 to 35 and over with the majority of them in the 18-25 group.   
17
 On the role of qualitative research see further (Webley, 2010).  
5in Higher Education institutions is an area that will need improving if we are to obtain 
clear balanced data even though this is more applicable to quantitative studies. 
Those who took part in the study did not necessarily display their faith by way 
of a religious symbol but those who did, displayed or carried crosses, fish pins, stones, 
tattoos, strings, hijabs, niqabs, kara bangles, turbans, ceremonial dagger (the 5Ks). 
Some carried multiple symbols such as three crosses. Others reported having symbols 
within their homes.18 For the purpose of this project, the terms ‘religion’ and ‘belief’ 
were taken as being self-defining and therefore given a broad meaning depending on 
the participants. It was felt that any attempt to define those terms would constitute a 
researcher’s bias which may influence the participants. As pointed by Weller, this 
approach is widely adopted by scholars of religion (Weller, 2011).
Finally, a thematic coding system was developed and the analysis was carried 
out using NVivo 9, a common software used for qualitative analysis. The codes 
emerged from designing the topic guides and reading through the literature.   
The Legal Background 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) approach in dealing with 
tolerance of religious symbols by the various member states of the Council of Europe 
has been one of deference on the assumption that sovereign States are generally in a 
better position to deal with such a sensitive area. As a result, there are few cases in 
which States have been found in breach of their obligations (Rorive, 2008-09). While 
the importance of religion in the making of one’s identity has been acknowledged by 
the Court,19 bans on religious symbols have generally been upheld20 on the ground 
18Out of the 25 participants, 18 wore a religious symbol. This includes all but one of the Muslims, seven out of the 
nine Christians, all of the Sikhs and Buddhists and only one in the Atheist, Agnostics, Non-believers groups. The 
Atheist (self-defined ‘non-believer’) referred to her wedding ring (a Celtic ring) as her symbol.   
19See Kokinakkis v Greece, ECHR, 25 May 1993 (Application No. 14307/88).
6that interference was justified in accordance with Article 9(2) ECHR.21 This has been 
particularly controversial in relation to the Muslim headscarf, especially since the 
ECtHR has sometimes associated the headscarf ban with the advancement of equality 
between men and woman22 (Evans, 2008). Both Evans and Rorive have argued that 
this approach amounts to a ‘distrust’ of the ECtHR towards the Islamic headscarf, 
accusing the court of relying on stereotypes and populist images which portray 
Muslim women as victims of an oppressive religion at the expense of using a more 
rigorous legal approach (Rorive 2008-09). It can be argued that this extends to law 
makers, as shown by the French Parliament’s famous assumption that wearing a niqab 
is against women’s dignity despite the lack of empirical evidence to support this 
assumption (Hunter-Henin, 2012).
The ECtHR approach has a resounding influence in both England and France 
which are the focus of this study. English Courts have tended to uphold decisions 
made by public authorities notably in cases involving religious symbols at school.23 
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, schools as public authorities have a duty to 
respect Article 9 of the ECHR on freedom of religion and belief. While England, 
unlike France does not ban the display of religious symbols in public by law, some 
schools ban certain symbols as part of their uniform policies. Similarly, French courts 
have been reluctant to interfere with law makers and have upheld religious symbols 
bans on the basis of Article 9(2). In the case of France, the justification is not uniform 
20
 See for instance Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, ECHR, 10 November 2005,(Application no. 44774/98),  Dahlab v. 
Switzerland, 15 January 2001, (Application no.42393/98) 
21
 Article 9 of the ECHR provides that: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
22
 See in particular Judge Tulkens dissenting with the majority in Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 January 2001, 
(Application no.42393/98) at para 11. 
23
 See for instance R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) (Respondent) v. 
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15 and R (on the application of Playfoot) v 
Governing Body of Millais School, [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin). 
7policies but the constitutional imperative of ‘laïcité’ which implies a complete 
separation between the state and religion. As such, religious symbols have been 
banned from state schools since 2004.24
Findings from the Empirical Study 
The empirical study focused on the meaning and significance of religious symbols 
and their place in the lives of individuals. The study entailed questioning the role and 
significance of religion in the making of individual and collective identity. Five main 
findings emerged from the data, namely that the way symbols are perceived is based 
on individuals’ personal experience with religion and culture; that religiosity is 
ascribed by birth through ancestors’ history but  evolves and crystallises via family 
upbringing,  education and spiritual journey of an individual;  that the reasons why 
people wear religious symbols are therefore highly intimate; that one’s relationship 
with symbols is ultimately dependent on one’s relationship with religion and that 
given the special nature of one’s relationship with symbols, State interference with 
any religious symbol (either through Parliament or the courts) should be kept to the 
minimum necessary to protect other citizens.  The following will examine each of 
these findings in turn. 
Perception of religious symbols is very personal in nature
As argued by Durkheim, an object is intrinsically neither sacred nor profane 
(Durkheim 1912); it becomes one or the other when individuals choose to consider it 
as such. Coser used the example of the wine in Church that is considered by believers 
as the blood of Christ rather than a beverage (Coser, 1977). This accords with the 
findings of the present study which clearly point to two radically different perceptions 
24
 See further (Bacquet, 2011).  
8of religious symbols according to whether or not an individual wears one. For those 
who wear symbols, they can be considered as sacred and form an intrinsic 
characteristic of their personality, whereas for most of those who do not wear them,25  
symbols are mostly insignificant: they do not matter. 
Those who did not wear symbols questioned their relevance and emphasised 
the importance of belief as opposed to wearing a symbol. Some described them as ‘a 
political statement’ or ‘a way to be seen’ whereas most of those who wore a religious 
symbol linked it to practicing their religion and viewed religion and symbols as a very 
important part of their lives.
‘I’ll never say what religion do you belong to? I just say do you believe in God? Belief is 
more important. … wearing any symbol doesn’t make you religious ….’ (SF10-11)26
‘You are meant to consider them like another body part – like your hand, you should 
never part from them (the 5Ks).’(SM1-1) 
Whether symbols matter therefore is tightly linked to whether individuals choose to 
consider them as sacred. Once they have entered the realm of the sacred, those 
symbols take a very personal and intimate significance, often linked to childhood, 
family history, tradition and one’s spiritual journey. Ultimately, they are part of an 
individual’s identity while at the same time reinforcing belonging in a particular 
group or culture.  
Religiosity of the individual is a result of upbringing and family history 
Religiosity of an individual is both acquired through birth status (ascribed) and 
developed throughout upbringing and family history (acquired), therefore, it can be 
argued that in some cases, religion and any associated symbols are to be considered as 
25
 Some of the non-symbol wearers nonetheless acknowledged the importance of symbols for other.   
26These references were generates to preserve the anonymity of the participants. S refers to a student, A refers to 
Academic. F is for female, M is for male and FG is for focus group. The numbers refer to the various interviews 
and transcripts. So for example: SF10-11 means student female – interviewee 10 and transcript 11.
9intrinsic characteristics of individuals as opposed to extrinsic values or ‘labels’ that 
could be added on, gained from the external environment. Religion is often not 
something that people choose – what they choose is whether to embrace or reject the 
faith they were brought up in. So someone could be intrinsically Muslim but 
extrinsically secular or agnostic. In other words, a person may have been born in a 
Muslim family and have grown up surrounded by Muslim culture, tradition and 
religious practice but over the years, they might have decided to abandon the faith – 
they would no longer class themselves as religiously Muslim but Islam would still 
inevitably be a part of their identity. This fits with the REDCo project27 findings 
where personal religious history was portrayed as a journey where the increased 
understanding of the faith by the participants meant that they would either embrace it 
or reject it (Thorsten et al, 2008 at 396).Therefore, one can argue that an individual 
may reject his/her faith but religion remains nonetheless part of his/her cultural and 
family heritage, somewhere down the line it relates to who they are and where they 
have come from.  What makes them embrace or reject their faith is a matter of belief. 
This became evident in this study amongst participants who had either converted, 
stopped practicing their religion or became non-believers. These findings also confirm 
Day’s (2011) thesis that belief is a social phenomenon allowing people to express 
their collective sense of belonging.  She argues that belief plays a role in shaping 
identities which individuals create to fit in social situations. Religion, she argues, is a 
subset of belief. 
The influence of the family unit on religion has further been recognised in 
research (Thorsten et al, 2008 at 378-381) and is also evident from the present 
27
 Religion in Education. A contribution to Dialogue or a factor of Conflict in transforming societies of European 
Countries (REDCo) – a project sponsored by the European Commission which focused on how European citizens 
of different religious and cultural background can live together. See further ˂http://www.redco.uni-
hamburg.de/web/3480/3481/index.html˂ [1.04.14].     
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findings. Indeed most participants in this study could trace their religious affiliation 
back to their family history and tradition. 
‘A religion is more like land that you inherit because my dad was Muslim so I was born 
Muslim.’ (SF15-18) 
‘…it’s true that in Islam if someone is a Muslim, they remain a Muslim…’ (FG2-17)
‘I don’t think religion is a choice.’ (SF11-12) 
‘…because in Asian families, family is central, you go by the religion of your parents 
and often that of your father.’ (SM8-9) 
When it came to symbols, they often had a sentimental as well as a religious 
significance and were also linked to the family unit. 
‘This cross was a present from my father to my mum when they were engaged…she gave 
it to me as an encouragement to pass my exam.’ (SM9-10) 
‘I have worn this for about 20 years [a cross]. My husband gave it to me for my birthday 
soon after we got married.’  (AF1-6) 
‘It [a cross] became more like something that’s there. If it wasn’t a cross I would still 
wear it.’ (SF7-8) 
This is what Day (2011) refers to as ‘believing in belonging’. She develops the 
concept of ‘performative belief’ to describe a phenomenon whereby people who 
would not otherwise be religious can have a collective religious identity. Symbols 
play an important role in the shaping of this collective identity. 
Despite the direct relationship between the religion of an individual and 
his/her family upbringing, very few participants (one did) complained of pressure to 
follow the religion of their parents. On the contrary, many young Muslim women 
revealed that they had taken up their headscarf against the will of their parents. This 
goes contrary to the frequent assumption that Muslim women are forced into wearing 
11
a headscarf. The French full face cover ban, for instance, is based on the assumption 
that women are oppressed into wearing a niqab.28
 ‘My best friend doesn’t wear hijab at all. She wants to but because of family restrictions 
she can’t.  … My other friend who started wearing the niqab, her mum stopped speaking 
to her.’ (SF16-21)   
‘I was so scared I didn’t want to tell her [mother] because I knew she wouldn’t like it 
(niqab) so one day I said I want to wear it and she said no.’ (SF18-23)  
Female Muslims admitted to being inspired but not pressurised by seeing others wear 
the hijab: 
‘I have always wanted to wear a jilbab and headscarf but I was kind of embarrassed or 
ashamed …I didn’t feel comfortable because my friends didn’t wear it at secondary 
school but when I left secondary school and went to a different environment where we all 
mixed … loads of girls wore jilbab and headscarf so I felt more comfortable and I started 
wearing it.’ (SF3-3)  
However, it is interesting that when it came to how the participants would raise their 
children,29 many admitted that they would not force their own religion onto them but 
would somehow be disappointed if they converted or did not follow their religion and 
practices. A Muslim participant described the feelings she would have with any of her 
future children should they decide to remove their headscarf once they reach the age 
of 20: 
 ‘Disappointed. I would persuade them again, take them to classes, lectures … I’ll do 
what I can to make them understand the importance of wearing it and if they still don’t 
wear it I don’t know what I would do then.’ (SF3-3)
Some (a minority amongst the most practicing individuals) were keen to let their 
(future) children decide when they become the right age30. 
28See further Garraud, 2010.
29
 Out of the 25 participants, 5 had one or more children. 
30
 Even though they did not specify what age they had in mind. 
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This desire from parents to transmit what they see as basic values is a further 
testimony to the direct relationship between religiosity and upbringing. It is clear 
therefore that religion and symbols are deeply rooted in family history and form an 
integral part of an individual’s personal history. It is the interplay between what can 
be considered as ascribed religion and what can be termed achieved religion that 
shapes contemporary31 religious identities.32  
Similarly, religiosity is tightly linked to cultural background and some 
religious practices are imbued with cultural practices. However there were some 
disagreements amongst the participants as to whether certain symbols or rituals were 
of religious or cultural significance but generally the more or less religious 
respondents (those at the far end of the spectrum) were keen to separate culture and 
religion. One practicing Muslim said: 
‘The culture is good but it’s nothing that I would hold in my heart at all …’ (SF16-21)
For the above participant, religion was so paramount that she was keen to draw a line 
between the two while emphasising the primacy of one over the other. On the 
contrary, some participants expressed being close to their cultural heritage but not to 
their religion- they were also keen to distinguish the two, while a third category of 
participants were comfortable with the overlap between culture and religion.  
The reasons for wearing a religious symbol are highly intimate 
Participants who wore a religious symbol did so for the following reasons: 
because they believed that is a requirement of their faith; as a sign of respect for their 
religion; as part of religious tradition; as a statement/reminder of their faith; for 
31
 Contemporary in this context is taken to mean broadly post September 11th with an emphasis on the globalised 
city. 
32
 On the role of ascription and choice in the construction of religious identities see further (Cadge and Davidman 
2006). 
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practical reasons; for protection; to please their Lord; or to show that they are proud 
of who they are and of their religion. 
‘Not because I believe it’s a must. It’s a must [wearing the hijab]’. (SF14-15) 
‘if it’s the law of God to wear this [niqab] then that’s it.’ (SF-16-21) 
‘because Islam is always on the media people want to show that they are proud of being 
Muslim…it’s really important that we can show our God that in this temporary world we 
did what we can to display our religion’ (SF3-3) 
‘As a Sikh I want my own identity’ (SF2-2)
‘It gives you a sense of cultural identity’ (SM4-4) 
‘I don’t see it as a requirement [cross] but it does help to remind me why I am a 
Christian.’ (SM8-9) 
They felt that their symbol gave them a sense of belonging to a group, a sense of 
comfort, support, protection and security. This has been recognised in research that 
shows religion as a coping resource, with symbols acting as a motivational factor 
during performance of goal relevant tasks (Weisbuch-Remington et al, 2005). 
‘When I am doing my exams I put it on the table [cross].’ (SF13-14) 
‘It gives you a sense of cultural identity. …Most people believe it helps to protect against 
evils and unknown forces…’ (SM4-4) 
‘sometimes when I can’t do something and I am struggling then I can look at that [a 
frame with the name of God written on it] and just remember it’s all up to God.’(FG2-
17)
‘It shows that there is someone watching me and even if things don’t go how I think they 
should go there is a plan. … I think everyone should be allowed to show their faith it’s a 
massive part of who people are how they think, their belief, their lifestyle and I don’t see 
a reason why it should not be displayed.’ (SF12-13) 
The decision to display one’s faith therefore is a deeply intimate one which is 
dependent on one’s conception of religiosity. In some cases, it is part of one’s identity 
as a religious being while in others it is a manifestation of being part of a group. For 
14
all the participants, it is an expression of belief and is driven by their own 
interpretation and understanding of religious doctrines but it generally does not matter 
whether co-religionists share their beliefs. What came out of the findings is a general 
sense of respect for individuals and an acknowledgment that spiritual journeys are 
personal and cannot be imposed. 
There was also a feeling amongst participants, especially those who valued 
symbols, that they were being abused by some, disrespected in a way that was devoid 
of their true meaning by being regarded, for example, as a fashion statement to please 
someone:
‘wearing any symbol doesn’t make you religious. …These symbols don’t really have 
value when people themselves take it on with no respect and just to wear it to please 
someone. It’s very disturbing.’ (SF10-11) 
This is interesting as it would suggest that for those who believe, display of faith 
alone is not enough but must be accompanied by belief. If we follow this line of 
argument, therefore, those who wear symbols have no proven interest in convincing 
others to wear them unless they also hold the same belief. In other words, wearing a 
symbol without the belief is seen as a disrespect of the symbol while having the belief 
but not wearing the symbol is generally seen as a matter for individuals to decide.  So 
the common argument that symbol wearers will passively influence others to wear the 
same symbols would not stand unless of course others could also be convinced of 
sharing the same belief which arguably would require more engagement from symbol 
wearers than just passively displaying their faith. It can be argued that this is yet 
another misconception used by states as an argument for removing symbols from 
15
public life. This misconception has been used by the French Parliament to justify the 
2004 ban of religious symbols at school. 33
One’s definition of religion determines one’s relationship with symbols 
Most participants described religion as one of three categories: a relationship 
with God, a way of life or a set of rules. Those who fell into the first category were 
those who tended not to wear a symbol and gave priority to belief over manifestation 
(these were mostly Christians but not exclusively). Those in the second category 
generally displayed their faith but were less strict in their religious practice. Religion 
was described as ‘a guide’, ‘part of who you are’, ‘part of your identity’ while those in 
the third category saw their religion as the driving force behind their life and were 
usually more strict in their practice linking their symbols to ‘full submission to God’ 
or following ‘what is in the teachings’. 
There was also a minority amongst participants who did not value religion or 
symbols and described the former as: ‘man made tradition’, ‘a shield for people to 
hide behind’, some kind of dogma imposed by an institution. These people were keen 
to part with their ascribed religious background even if it involved a troubled 
relationship with their families. 
In sum, participants placed religion on a very broad spectrum. This bears out 
with the findings of the REDCo project mentioned above where the various 
interpretations of religions by the participants included personal faith, spiritual 
experience, comfort and support, moral guidance, communal belonging, factual 
knowledge, philosophical theory, societal role and irrelevancy. (Thorsten at al, 2008 
at 376-77).
33See further the French Parliament proselytising argument (Stasi, 2003). 
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Symbols and religion therefore cannot be separated. Those who display their 
faith sometimes do so to satisfy what they see as an absolute religious requirement, 
(symbols are seen as ascribed) while others simply wish to express their faith freely. 
In both cases they are extremely important to those individuals who see them as 
sacred. 
Having established the deeply intimate and personal nature of the relationship 
between individuals and their religious symbols, the research went on to explore the 
impact of State intervention with those symbols on individuals.   
State intervention with manifestation of belief is necessary but must be limited
Most participants agreed that the State should be able to intervene with 
manifestation of belief where harm is being caused or when safety is at stake as in the 
case of extremism for instance, to prevent harm, when the rule of law is challenged 
and as a last resort. 
‘The only way that the State should intervene is if your belief or your faith is offensive’… 
(SF12-13)
Christians felt that they would be prepared to take off their cross if required because 
they did not generally see it as a requirement of their faith: 
‘I wouldn’t have a problem with it [taking her cross off in order to go to school] because 
it would not make me any less or more of a Christian.’ (SF10-11)    
Whereas nearly all Muslims and Sikhs were not prepared to part from their symbols:
 ‘that women would feel naked without the niqab.’(FG2-17)
‘religion is probably the most important thing in my life – I would not be able to live in a 
country that didn’t allow me to follow it properly.’ (SM1-1) 
‘If I took my turban off I would be disrespecting my hair and my guru’ (SM1-1)  
Whether one is prepared to remove his/her symbol therefore depends on one’s view of 
the role of symbols and as described above, views of symbols are determined by one’s 
17
religiosity. If an individual wears a symbol as an absolute requirement of their faith 
then they are less likely to be prepared to remove such symbol than if they merely 
wear it as an expression of faith. This was apparent when participants commented on 
the French approach to manifestation of belief. 
Most participants disagreed with the banning of religious symbols at school, 
although they were less critical and more understanding of banning the full face cover 
in the public domain.34 Nonetheless, some found it oppressive for the State to decide 
how individuals should dress in the street and others found it dangerous as it could be 
the starting point to a more controlling state. 
‘You shouldn’t force religion on anyone but you shouldn’t take away someone’s religion 
either.’ (FG2-17) 
‘I think it is a bit too extreme because it is a personal choice to display your faith … it’s 
different when it’s health and safety, jewellery policies but when it’s no symbols at all 
that’s a bit too much.’ (SF6-7)  
Many of the participants found the French approach extreme, discriminatory, unfair, 
disrespectful, oppressive and controlling. 
‘We are human beings, the culture, religion is just part of us. You can’t take away these 
things. If you want to take those away you have to take our family away, you have to take 
our identity away’ (SF5-5) 
‘I think everyone should be allowed to show their faith it’s a massive part of who people 
are, how they think, their belief, their lifestyle and I don’t see a reason why it should not 
be displayed.’ (SF12-13)
While others, albeit a minority, agreed with the approach: 
‘It’s a positive outlook because you are trying to make everyone equal – no religion 
should be overtaking or overpowering the other.’ (SF10-11)
‘I do think it’s a good thing because it gives the girls who don’t want to wear it [hijab] to 
be free at school.’ (SF11-12) 
34
 For further details about the French approach see (Bacquet, 2011). 
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Again, those who agreed with the approach tended to be those participants who did 
not display their faith by way of religious symbol. By contrast, most participants felt 
at ease with the University of Westminster’s multicultural environment which most  
described as: ‘quite comfortable’, ‘perfectly normal’, ‘reassuring’, ‘really nice’, 
‘great’, ‘welcoming’ and  ‘interesting’. A minority admitted that they would feel 
uncomfortable sharing a classroom with fully veiled women: 
‘I wouldn’t say I would feel totally safe in my class if there was a girl wearing a burqa.’ 
(SF2-2) 
It appears therefore that the degree of interference an individual is prepared to take 
with his/her symbol is fully dependent on why they wear a symbol in the first place. If 
they consider it as a religious requirement then any unjustified request by the State 
that the individual in question should remove their symbol will be seen as a violation 
of the individual’s identity. Given the special nature of the relationship between 
individuals and their symbols, they are not objects that can be merely taken on and off 
in the way that one removes a hat for instance or folds one’s umbrella upon entering a 
building. This should certainly be the primary consideration for anyone attempting to 
interfere with one’s religious symbols.  
Conclusion
The necessity to control manifestation of belief in a pluralist society is both 
evident and undeniable but the degree of control that a State can exercise on such 
manifestation is a sensitive debate. In deciding where to draw the line, an 
understanding of religious symbols and their impact on individual’s sense of self is 
paramount. This study began by asking whether religious symbols matter at all. 
Through the empirical research, it explored the relationship that individuals have with 
their religious symbols and the extent to which those symbols form part of an 
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individual or group identity. There is a sense that in the globalised world, individual’s 
identities are increasingly being absorbed within the pluralist environment and 
individuals feel more and more detached from their religious and cultural identity. 
They turn to religious symbols in order to get the sense of belonging and comfort that 
they lack in an increasingly individualised world. The symbols are a link to their 
community and as such are part of who they are as both individuals and as part of a 
group. What comes out of the empirical study is the deeply intimate nature of one’s 
relationship with religious symbols. What outsiders may perceive as a mere artefact is 
for the wearer an item charged with emotional and spiritual meaning. As this study 
demonstrated, contemporary religious identities are complex and the result of both 
ascribed and achieved components. Therefore, when a State attempts to interfere with 
religious symbols as is increasingly being witnessed in some parts of the world,35 it 
runs the risk of overstepping into the private sphere of an individual. UK Courts have 
come close to this in their interpretation of Article 9 in cases such as Begum and 
Playfoot36 while the French Parliament has adopted a blanket ban on religious 
symbols at schools and for those who provide a public service.37 For many, symbols 
comfort, reassure, protect or simply are part of their being. Depriving an individual of 
his/her symbols therefore without any justification based on harm, health and safety 
or threat to the community amounts to depriving them of an identity. In a pluralist 
society, the State has a duty to respect both the religious and the secular, without 
trying to impose any ideology upon its citizens who must remain free to have their 
own identity based on their religious and cultural background. State interference must 
35
 See further Howard 2011.
36
 R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) (Respondent) v. Headteacher and Governors 
of Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15 and R (on the application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais 
School, [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin).
37See further (Bacquet, 2011). 
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be based on necessity and any restrictions must not be disproportionate to the aim 
being pursued.
Across Europe, laws and policies on manifestation of beliefs however seem to 
be constructed on a majoritarian approach. As argued by Bhandar,38 human rights 
norms and values are defined by reference to Christian culture. Across Europe, the 
dominance of the Church is still evident, despite many countries adopting a secular 
model and officially separating Church and State. In this context, perceptions of 
symbols have tended to be based on the assumptions that they are not essential which 
is largely the case in Christianity where there is no particular requirement for 
members of the faith to display a particular symbol (belief-based). The absence of a 
requirement does not however mean that the wearer should be deprived of the 
freedom to manifest, should they wish to do so. This has been confirmed by the 
ECtHR in the Eweida case.39 Most religious minorities across Europe belong to a faith 
where there tends to be a duty to manifest religion by way of religious symbols 
(Muslims, Jews, Sikh) these faith are not just based on belief but include a 
requirement of practice. 
‘they (belief and manifestation) go together because when you have a certain belief you 
follow it as it is. I don’t think that any Government can interfere with your religion.’ 
(FG2-17) 
‘there are religions where you can have your belief but they won’t be complete without 
the symbol.’ (SF2-2)
Ultimately, what is needed is an acknowledgment by States that symbols play 
a major role in the making of contemporary religious identities. This would suggest 
that religious minorities are engaged with laws and policies that directly affect them. 
38Bhandar (2009) in Hunter – Henin above n. 9 at 615.
39Eweida and others v. the UK(Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10), 27 May 2013. 
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